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Abstract 
One of the basic principles that allow a smooth operation of the markets is the equilib-
rium between supply and demand. According to this principle, when demand exceeds 
supply, the price mechanism will try to bring the system back into equilibrium. When this 
thinking is applied to the housing market, it leads to the conclusion that any inequality in 
housing supply or demand is transitory. Nonetheless, the fact that a considerable share of 
the population live in precarious homes for generations seems to speak against the virtues 
of market mechanisms in the resolution of housing disequilibria.  
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that in the face of asymmetric information, under some 
conditions the equilibrium of the credit market can be marked by rationing. Asymmetric 
information – working through the effects of adverse selection and of incentive – has im-
pacts on the return function of bank loans, which leads to interest rates used in housing 
loans to be different from those that balance supply and demand for credit, causing credit 
rationing. Literature of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) in turn points out the fact 
that institutions can reduce the degree of uncertainty by lessening the effects of asymmet-
ric information. Regarding the housing market, the degree of property rights, as well as 
the mortgage institution which acts as a contract enforcement tool, provide the credit 
market with information on the quality of the borrower and thus broaden the social scope 
of this market. The purpose of this article is to understand how the equilibrium in the 
housing market is influenced by credit rationing and to what extend institutional devel-
opment affects this scarcity and the interest rates of housing loans. The model developed 
in this article, which combines the tradition of dynamic models of housing investment 
with the premises of the New Institutional Economics and the considerations of Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) and (1992) on rationing in the credit market, allows us to identify the 
role of institutions on housing development. 
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Rationed credit market, Housing development 
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1. Introduction 
One of the basic principles that allow a smooth operation of markets is the equi-
librium between supply and demand. According to this principle, when demand 
exceeds supply, the price mechanism brings the system back into equilibrium, re-
ducing demand or increasing supply until a balance is reached where no shortage 
of goods is found. The lack and surplus of goods in market are, within this context, 
transitory situations that temporally bind two stable equilibriums. 
  When this thinking is applied to the housing market, it leads to the conclu-
sion that any inequality in housing supply or demand is also transitory. A possible 
excess of demand caused, say, by a demographic boom or by a large migration flow 
would raise housing prices in a given region, i.e., leading to higher rents. These 
higher prices would in turn trigger new investment, considering that at a given 
interest rate, the yield of real estate investment would be more attractive than 
that of other investment alternatives. In the case of a family renting a home, 
higher rent in comparison to the interest rate would signal that this would be a 
good time to seek a mortgage. In the case of a family with savings, this higher rent 
would tell them that this would be the right moment to use their assets invested 
in other ways to buy a home. In either case, a shortage of homes in the market 
would lead, through higher prices, to greater real estate investment, with a simul-
taneous growth of both demand and supply of credit in financial market. 
  The price mechanism in housing markets was first formalized in Muth 
(1960), later improved on by Muth and Goodman (1989), summarizing the hous-
ing-market analysis in the partial equilibrium tradition. By admitting the exis-
tence of an homogeneous housing stock, the capacity to generate housing services 
became an increasing function of the capital stock. Following this tradition, the 
financial market supplies all the necessary capital for investment in the housing 
market, a fact which renders any disequilibria transitory.  
  The same argument of investment behavior was established in a dynamic 
context by Tobin (1969). Considering the case of housing market, Tobin’s q can be 
defined as the ratio between housing market price and the cost of replacing a 
housing capital unit. This relative price would signal the real estate market, 
which price would also reflect the net return of housing investments. In this ap- 
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proach, real estate appreciation is given by the difference in current price and ex-
pected value of housing capital, less its depreciation, plus the rent owned. The 
equilibrium condition in the financial market, which presupposes the existence of 
arbitrage, imposes the equality between the return on investment and the market 
interest rate. Any excess demand for housing services would appreciate real state 
market price relatively to the cost of replacing a housing capital unit, leaving 
Tobin’s q higher than 1, which induces investments. At the long term, housing 
capital accumulation would increase the supply of housing services clearing this 
market. The excess demand lasts only for the time necessary for the planning and 
building of new homes.1 
   One aspect in common in all these approaches is the perfect credit market 
premise, which provides all the necessary capital to carry out the desired real es-
tate investments. Nonetheless, if the capital market does not supply the necessary 
capital for carrying out the desired real estate investments, the rise in rent prices 
caused by an excess demand will not necessarily subside. Consequently, there will 
be other factors affecting the equilibrium in the real estate market. In particular, 
if the housing credit market is rationed, for any reason whatsoever, the adjust-
ment dynamics can be different from that analyzed by the approaches above de-
scribed.  
  In addition, the fact that a considerable share of the population, particu-
larly in less-developed nations, has lived in precarious homes for generations ap-
parently speaks against the virtues of market mechanisms in the resolution of 
housing disequilibria. We use the word “apparently”, because in most of these na-
tions, it must be said, both the real state market as well as the credit market are 
not necessarily of the sort that ensures stable dynamic equilibriums without ra-
tioning. The line of thinking described above assumes a series of conditions to 
achieve this, which are not necessarily fulfilled in developed countries and mainly 
in developing nations: (i) property rights must be secured; (ii) legal safeguards 
must ensure the binding of contracts; (iii) both the rent and the interest rate must 
be freely set by the parties; and (iv) there must be only one financial market, 
which efficiently allocates savings. 
                                                           
1 Following the tradition of rational expectations, Sheffrin (1983) sums up the previous argu-
ments and formalizes a dynamic model of housing, in which appreciation of housing prices, 
inflation, and taxes drive housing investments.  
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  Obviously, if one or more of these conditions is not fully satisfied, the mar-
ket mechanisms will lose their equilibrium-seeking characteristics and the rela-
tive scarcity will not be addressed automatically along time. This happens because 
in a market in which these conditions are not present, the return on investments 
will be surrounded by uncertainty and real estate credit could be rationed.  
  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that in the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation, the equilibrium of the credit market can be rationed, in the sense that,  
among apparently identical credit applicants, some are able to secure credit and 
others not, or there are some particular groups of individuals in society that are 
redlined from the credit market. This happens because when banks provide credit, 
they try to maximize their return by focusing on the following two aspects: the 
cost of loanable funds, and the risk involved in the project undertaken. According 
this authors, because the imperfect market information, the terms of credit con-
tracts – the need for collateral and the interest rate set by the bank – as well as 
the amount of the loan can indeed affect the quality of the group of borrowers in 
two ways: (i) the adverse selection effect of borrowers2; and (ii) the incentive effect3.   
  This article analyzes the real estate market, emphasizing the role of credit 
in long-term adjustment. It goes on to evaluate how asymmetric information and 
the absence of liquidity mechanisms, the result of the lack of the four conditions 
described above can end up rationing real estate credit. Finally, it suggests a ra-
tioned-credit model for housing market, in which the short-term interest rate, 
credit availability and institutional development play a fundamental role in the 
equilibrium of the housing market. 
                                                           
2 By dissuading “safe” investors, i.e., those who invest in less risky projects, from seeking loans 
in banks, the contract can change the distribution of the group of borrowers. Considering that 
the bank’s expected return depends on the probability of those loans being repaid, borrowers 
who are aware of the scant probability of paying back their loans and are willing to pay higher 
interest rates will automatically be considered low-quality borrowers. Likewise, inasmuch as 
higher guarantee demands reduce the average degree of risk-aversion of the group of borrow-
ers, the banks’ return is also reduced. 
3 The incentive effect reflects changes in the behavior of investors, who prefer higher-risk pro-
jects. Adjustments in the prime interest rate (which is also a part of the loan’s cost) and in the 
terms of the contracts {C, r} affect the behavior of the borrower: with a higher prime interest 
rate, we see a reduction in the expected return for the investor of the project to be financed, 
which leads such investor to seek higher-risk projects. These are projects with slim chances of 
success, but if successful can bring substantial returns.  
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2. Rationing in credit market: the general argument 
Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), in a market with imperfect information, 
banks do not know how to screen the individual borrower, because they are not 
able to directly control the actions of all borrowers4. Thus, loan contracts are 
drafted so as to induce borrowers to take actions that are of interest to the bank 
and to lure high-quality borrowers, with low-risk projects. One of the mechanisms 
that help sort out “good” and “bad” borrowers is the loan’s interest rate. For a 
given interest rate, the expected profits of the firm increase with the risk of the 
project.  
  To see if the interest rate acts as a protection mechanism for banks, the 
following is set by the authors: for a given loan interest rate (r ˆ), there is a critical 
value of risky project θ ˆ  for which the agent borrows from the bank, if and only if 
θ θ ˆ > . Supposing that all loans have the same amount, the net return for the bor-
rower is described by equation (1). In this equation, the investor’s expected return 
is the higher of the following values: (i) the level of wealth (W), plus the return of 
the project (R), less the amount of the loan, interests included (B + r.B); or (ii) the 
level of wealth, less the amount of the collaterals required by the credit contract 
(C). The first value holds if project is successful, otherwise holds the second value. 
Therefore, the value of θ   for which the agent’s expected return is zero must sat-
isfy the following condition:  
(1)  [] ∏ ∫
∞
= θ − + − + ≡ θ
0 0 ) , ( ; ) 1 ( max ) , ( R dF C W B r R W r ,  
where i is the prime interest rate, W0 is the initial level of wealth, C0 denotes the 
present value of collateral C. Therefore,  ) 1 ( 0 i W W + =  and  ). 1 ( 0 i C C + =  
   Analyzing the credit supply side, the banks’ expected return on a loan, be-
cause of the adverse selection effect, is a decreasing function of the risk degree of 
the loan and is given by expression (2). According to this equation, the borrower 
must pay to the bank the total amount of the debt or the most he can pay if the 
project failures, (R + C). 
                                                           
4 In this paper, we consider only loans supplied by the formal credit market. An extension of 
this argument to an economy with informal credit market, in which social norms are the true 
mechanism of contract enforcement, could be seen in Ghosh, Mookherjee and Ray (2000).   
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(2)  )) 1 ( ; min( ) , ( r B C R r R + + = ρ  
  The adverse selection argument, in which higher interest rates can lead to 
falling bank returns, comes from the fact that on average the quality of the bor-
rowers deteriorates; i.e., the higher the interest rates, the greater the value of θ . 
This result is obtained when equation (1) is differentiated: 
0
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The second way in which the interest rate affects the banks’ expected re-
turn on granted loans is the change in borrower behavior: as climbing interest 
rates raise the attractiveness of high-risk projects, the banks’ return is dimin-
ished. Therefore, with an increase of r, the expected return of a project with a high 
chance of liquidation falls less than the expected return of a project with a smaller 
chance of liquidation. If a risk-neutral investor feels indifferently before two pro-
jects, a rise in the interest rate will lead the agent to choose the project with a 
smaller chance of liquidating the loan. 
  From this argument follows the main proposition about the relation be-
tween loan interest rate and the expected return of banks. According to this 
proposition, ρ(r) will not be a monotonic function of r, which implies that there will 
be a ρ*, associated to r*, that maximizes expected returns of banks. Since is sup-
posed that loans supply is an increasing monotonic function of the expected return 
of banks, there will be a level L* of loans supply that maximizes banks profits. 
Figure 1 illustrates how the credit market works when the interest rate is used as 
a shield against the incentive effect and the adverse selection effect that can re-
duce the banks’ expected return. 
In figure 1, the third quadrant shows the banks’ credit supply in relation to 
the expected return: the higher the loan’s expected return, the greater the credit 
offered. However, as shown in the second quadrant, the banks’ expected return 
increases at decreasing rates in relation to the interest rate. Therefore, there is an 
optimal rate of interest r*, that maximizes the banks’ expected return, above 
which this return starts to decrease. At equilibrium interest rate r*, which maxi-
mizes the banks’ expected return, they supply L*. Any loan interest rate increase 
above r* would also reduce loan supply.  
  






















Figure 1: Equilibrium in the rationed credit market 
 
Considering that loan demand is a decreasing function of loan interest rate, 
which is also illustrated in the first quadrant of figure 1, for some supply of loan-
able funds, there is any excess demand for credit, illustrated by the difference Z,  
between LD and LS, which prevail at interest rate r*. It can be seen that in a sce-
nario of excess demand for loans, there are borrowers willing to pay interest rate 
rm > r*, which is the interest rate at which demand matches supply. But consider-
ing that banks seek to maximize their profits, they will not lend to individuals 
who are willing to pay a rate above r*. Eventually, as argued by Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981), the increase in loanable funds would shift upward the loan supply curve, 
reducing the excess demand for funds, but without any change on loan interest 
rate. Only if the demand for funds is fully satisfied, i.e., when there is no credit 
rationing, increases in loanable funds will promote a decrease on interest rates. As 
a consequence, the credit market does not have competitive forces that lead, in 
any situation, the supply of funds to match its demand, and credit is therefore ra-
tioned.  
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However, according to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the interest rate is not the 
only contract factor that matters. The amount of the loan and its collaterals also 
affect the borrowers’ behavior. If banks demand higher guarantees, this can lead 
to borrowers willing to bear smaller risks, in less risky projects. On the other 
hand, demand for higher collateral can lead to a reduction in the banks’ return: if 
there is total aversion to decreasing risk, and if all individuals (with identical util-
ity functions) face the same investment opportunities, wealthier individuals will 
be more willing to offer more collateral, which illustrates their disposition to em-
bark on riskier projects than are less wealthy individuals. The effect of this ad-
verse selection can dominate the positive effects of collateral requirement. As a 
consequence, there is also a limit after which it is no longer lucrative for banks to 
raise the requirement for guarantees in the presence of excess demand for credit, 
just as it happens with the loan’s interest rate. 
Thus, the rationing of the credit market takes place if the following three 
conditions are met: (i) there is imperfect information; (ii) the effects of adverse se-
lection and incentive are considerable; and (iii) the banks’ expected return under 
the Walrasian equilibrium must be lower than in any other contract with credit 
rationing. In Stiglitz and Weiss (1992) this analysis is expanded for the case in 
which both problems – incentive and adverse selection – are present. In this 
model, the banks use the required guarantees and the interest rates as instru-
ments to screen and encourage borrowers. One of findings of this work is that the 
whole class of loan applicants can be rationed and that this rationing must take 
place with every contract. 
3.  The rationed credit market for real estate projects 
Based on the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and (1992) rationing model, it is 
possible to describe a market for lending to real estate projects, with minor 
changes. Let’s initially consider that information is imperfect, that is, banks do 
not know how to screen the individual borrower credit risk. Therefore, the loan 
interest rate and the mortgage requirements end up being the mechanisms that 
reduce the effects of adverse selection and incentive. Equation (3) expresses the 
optimal loan interest rate, which is set up in order to maximize bank’s expected 
returns. In the same way, we can define the amount of credit supplied by banks,  
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L*, as a monotonic function of r* and of the amount of loanable funds in real estate 
market (S).  
(3) )) , ( ( max
* r R r ρ ≡ ρ   
(4) 0   and   0 ), , ( *
* * > ′ > ′ ≡ S r S r L l l l  
  Note that the banks’ profits are defined as the difference between r* and 
loan costs, which are determined by the economy’s prime interest rate, the oppor-
tunity costs, and the costs relative to safeguarding the property rights, incurred, 
say, in evaluating the value of the real estate property and in foreclosing mort-
gages. In this sense, we say that operational costs associated with the degree of 
institutional development are included in banks spread.5  
The credit demand for real estate projects satisfies three basic premises: (i) 
it is segmented into four different levels of wealth6 – Wc, Wb, Wba e Wa, such as  
Wc < Wb < Wba < Wa; (ii) wealth is comprised real assets, which can be used as col-
laterals C, being that Cc < Cb < Cba < Ca, and of human capital income, from likely 
inheritance and retirement, H; and (iii) there is a minimum initial wealth level  
(Wi0 > C) to allow family i to be included in the group demanding housing credit, 
which will have its projects reviewed by the banks. 
Figure (2) illustrates agent’s behavior in this market. Each individual has a 
safe investment alternative with return ρ*, with expected utility Ui(Wi0,r*). Fami-
lies belonging to the c group are not part of the credit demand because they do not 
possess the minimum wealth requirement (Wc0 < C). For these families, both the 
expected utility of investing in a safe investment as well as that of a self-financed 
housing investment are greater than the expected utility of taking out a loan to 
undertake7 a real estate project. Families with wealth between Wb and Wa de-
mand credit, because the expected utility for taking out a loan at the bank is 
greater than the risk-free investment. However, a subset of families, those which 
have wealth located in the Wba interval, will still undertake a project, even if they 
do not qualify for a loan, because the expected utility from these loans is above 
that of other investment alternatives. Lastly, the group Wa represents the set of 
                                                           
5 By construction, these costs are a nonmonotonic function of institutional development.  
6 According to Stiglitz (1981) it is supposed that all borrowers are risk-averse with the same 
utility function U(W), U’ > 0, U” < 0 and that individuals differ only when it comes to wealth.  
7 Housing investment with self-financing, for low-income families, can be seen as self-building.   
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families with the greatest wealth. The families in this group do not need credit 
and embark on risky investments in real estate using only their own assets. 
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Figure 2:  The segmented housing credit market 
 
To better understand what determines the group of families that demand 
real estate credit and the reasons for which, and that of families demanding but 
not receiving credit undertake a real estate project, it is necessary to analyze the 
expected-utility function that maximizes the return of the project for a given level 
of initial wealth. Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), families that secure credit 
and carry out a real estate project obtain an expected utility, given by the follow-
ing expression: 
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in which p(R) is the probability of a project being successful. The value that 
maximizes the expected utility of the investor is the maximum return between a 
safe investment and a self-financed project – )] ( ˆ *), ( max{ ) ( 0 0 0 0 W V W U W V ρ = . It can 
be seen that:  

















  It can thus be established that risk aversion is absolutely decreasing; the 
greater the family’s initial level of wealth, the lesser the expected utility of the 













Therefore, there is a critical value of wealth Wb, such as, if the wealth is 
greater than this value, families not able to secure credit still embark on the real 
estate project – these are families in the interval Wba. For families with absolute 
and decreasing risk aversion and wealth below this critical value, the expected 
utility is give by equation (6): 




0 W V p C W U p R r W U B R ≡ − ρ − + + + − ρ . 
In this case, individuals take out loans if, and only if,  ) ( ) ( 0 0 0 W V W VB ≥ . But 
since 
*
2 1 )) 1 ( ( / ρ − ′ + ′ = p U p U dW dVB , only when Wi0 > C, it is profitable to take out 
a loan. It is assumed that there is wealth different from zero, called Wb, such as 
Vb(Wb) = U(ρ*,Wb) – which is true for some values of ρ*. Using the same argument 
above, it becomes clear that in Wb the act of taking out a loan ensures medium 
utility that preserves the spread of terminal wealth in comparison with not taking 
out the loan and not embarking on the project. Therefore, if 
0 0 0 0 / ) ( / dW W dV dW dVB > , 
for  b b W W W ˆ
0 < < , all individuals qualify to take out a loan. Considering that 
b W W ˆ
0 < , if there is a loan, the wealthiest individual will be the one benefited8. 
It is time now to analyze the effects of changes in exogenous variables on 
the housing credit market. Particular attention is given to the effects on equilib-
rium in regards to: (a) institutional changes that lead to a reduction in the mort-
gage transaction costs; (b) changes in monetary policy that imply in varying the 
                                                           
8 This restriction is weaker than the imposition of a scale of projects that exceeds the wealth of 
any individual. 
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cost of opportunity of loans or of loanable funds; (c) policies for the granting of 
subsidies; and (d) policies that secure property rights. 
(a) The effects of a reduction in the mortgage transaction costs 
The cost of foreclosing mortgages is one of the components of the banks’ to-
tal loan cost that is intimately associated to the legal structure and to law en-
forcement. In supposing a reduction is such costs – brought, say, by the creation of 
a real estate fiduciary ownership title – the banks’ total loan cost is thus reduced 
and, when passed on to the loan’s interest rate, changes the equilibrium of the 
rationed credit market. The effect of the reduction in the cost of foreclosing real 
guarantees on the demand and offer of credit is shown in figure (3).  
 











































        (a)                   (b) 
Figure 3:  The reduction in the cost of foreclosing mortgages 
 
The reduction in the loan’s interest rate gives the investor’s expected-utility 
function in relation to his initial wealth (W0) a steeper slope. This means that 
equality between the expected return of the safe investment and that of borrowing 
assets and embarking on the real estate project becomes true for a lower level of 
initial wealth. This means that the number of families that seek credit rises, for a 
given wealth distribution. The result on the credit supply of loanable funds is 
shown in figure (3.b). In the graph’s second quadrant, we see the curve that re-
lates the loan’s interest rate and the banks’ expected return shift downwards and  
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leftwards. This is attributable to the reduction in the incentive and adverse selec-
tion effects, which trigger an expansion of the banks’ expected return at the same 
rate of the loan’s interest rate. In the third quadrant, which represents the rela-
tion between the offer of funds and the banks’ return, we see a rise in the supply 
of housing credit, up to the point where the new rationed-equilibrium interest rate 
r** is reached – the one that maximizes ρ. Lastly, in the first quadrant, which 
represents the relation between the loan’s interest rate and the supply and de-
mand of funds, we can see the rise in demand on the curve LD, representing an 
increase in the number of families demanding mortgage credit, and the upward 
and leftward shift of supply curve. At this new equilibrium, there is an offer L** 
greater than the previous one, all other constant parameters remaining constant. 
The new resulting equilibrium also provides for credit rationing; however, it can 
be greater or lesser than the previous one, depending on the slope of the two 
curves. 
(b) The effects of monetary policy: higher liquidity 
  Analyzing the demand for loanable funds, a cut in the interest rates re-
duces the cost of opportunity of a risk-less investment – government bonds, for 
example – that offer returns at rate r, and increases availability of funds for hous-
ing loans. This change reduces the slope of the expected-utility curve of the risk-
less investment in figure (4.a), and causes the supply curve of the first quadrant of 
figure (4.b) to shift upwards and leftwards. On the other hand, there is a drop in 
loan costs and a consequent rise in returns of borrowing and embarking on a hous-
ing project, which shifts the loan’s expected-utility curve upwards and leftwards. 
  It can be seen that with diminishing interest rates, it is expected that the 
supply of loanable funds rises and reaches that lower-income share of the popula-
tion. Here we have the premise that there are automatic mechanisms for channel-
ing liquidity from the financial market to the housing-credit market. Should no 
such mechanism exist, an effect on the credit supply lesser than that of equilib-
rium with an automatic expansion of the credit supply can be expected. Credit 
reaching the lower-income segments of the population can be explained by the 
incentive effect:  the more diversified the credit, the less is the risk of the pool of 
borrowers. 
  













































        (a)                   (b) 
Figure 4: Higher liquidity in the credit market 
(c) The effects of a social policy of subsidies 
  As seen above, in order for a family to join the housing-credit market, it is 
necessary for this family to have a minimum initial wealth. Moreover, the higher 
the ratio between total initial wealth and the collateral, the lesser the risk on the 
banks’ expected return, something which should diminish the possibility of credit 
rationing. Nonetheless, housing policies that raise the lower-income families’ ini-
tial wealth level only expand rationing, if such policies are not followed by a con-
sistent credit expansion. 
  The lump-sum transfer of wealth from the richer to the poorer layers of so-
ciety does not change the curves in figure (5.a). However, it does change wealth 
distribution in society, raising the percentage of families with wealth in the inter-
val between Wb and Wa.  This effect is shown as the upward shift of the credit-
demand curve in figure (5.b), which if not followed by a credit expansion will lead 
to greater rationing. 
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        (a)                   (b) 
Figure 5: The policy of subsidies 
(d) The effects of securing property rights 
  To shed some light on the importance of secure property rights, and its re-
lation with the development of a credit market, it might be worthwhile to quote 
De Soto (2000). The author argues that there are families in poor countries that 
hold substantial assets, but the lack of due property rights prevents these assets 
from being used as collateral for credit purposes, thus limiting the potential use of 
this property. In contrast, he cites the case of rich countries, where property rights 
are well defined and the full potential of assets is exploited. This means that 
within an environment where property rights are safeguarded, there would be 
room for a secondary market for mortgage securities.  
  Raising the level of wealth of these families stokes the credit market, which 
in turn leads to housing development. Figure (6) shows the effects of securing 
property rights in the housing-credit market. Considering that property rights 
raise the wealth of the families, the curve of the families’ wealth is shifted right-
wards, increasing the number of families demanding housing credit. However, in 
order to have a positive effect of these policies on the credit market, and conse-
quent improvement of the housing development, it is not enough to secure prop-
erty rights. If the credit offer remains unchanged, the result will be a higher ex-
cess demand for credit. 
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        (a)                   (b) 
Figure 6: Property rights 
  To prevent the new demand from deteriorating the rationing situation, 
these new policies must come hand in hand with institutional changes that ensure 
safeguarding measures for mortgage foreclosure. The reasoning of the effects of 
these measures on the reduction of bank costs, developed in case (a), would then 
also apply, leading to greater credit supply, as shown in figure (6.b). 
4.  Stationary equilibrium in the real estate market 
with rationing in the credit market  
As analyzed in the previous sections, rationed equilibrium in the credit market 
responds to changes in wealth distribution, in the economy’s interest rates, and in 
the costs of foreclosing a mortgage. Wealth distribution and mortgage foreclosure 
costs in turn respond to institutional changes. We must now evaluate these effects 
on the dynamic equilibrium of the housing market. This is done in this section, 
incorporating the mechanisms that govern the credit market in a housing invest-
ment model based on Tobin’s approach. To focus the analysis only on the effects on 
the equilibrium of a rationed credit market, the basic structure of the housing in-
vestment models is preserved as much as possible.  
  It is assumed that at any moment of time, the economy has Nt families that 
grow at a constant rate n. It is also considered that the demand of the representa-
tive family for rental property (kd) depends directly on this family’s wealth (w) and 
inversely on the value of the rent (R), as shown in equation (7). In the short term,  
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the supply of real estate property is fixed – expression (8) – which implies that the 
rent rate is determined only by demand conditions, as stated in equation (9).  
(7) 0 and 0 , . ) ( > β > ′ β − = w t t
d
t f R w f k  
(8)  t t
s












  Following Tobin (1969),  t q  is defined as the ratio between market price ( t p ) 
and the replacement cost of one unit of housing capital ( t c ) – equation (5.4). When 
t q  > 1, the market price of one housing unit is greater than the cost of building an 
identical housing unit. In this case, it is said that there is incentive to invest, more 
specifically in our case, in the building of new housing units. If  t q  < 1, conversely, 
it is cheaper to buy a ready home than to build one; in this case the families are 
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  If we suppose that the construction cost is constant,  t q  becomes the relative 
real estate property’s market value, and it will vary according to  t p  fluctuations, 
which is determined by return, less depreciation, provided by rental income. For 
the rental sector, the return from one period to the next will be the ratio between 
the total amount available to the owner in the following period and the value of 
the property in the initial period. The total amount available to the owner in the 
subsequent period will be the following: the new market value of the property, 
plus rent income, less depreciation of the previous stock. For continuous time, 









  Because capital market is not perfect – it can be affected by asymmetric 
information that leads to credit rationing – families are not able to fully arbitrage 
between gains in the rent market and those from the financial assets market. In 
fact, if the rent income, net of depreciation, is above the interest rate, families will  
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have incentives to seek bank loans and invest in housing. However, in a market of 
rationed credit, not all families that have the necessary conditions to apply for 
credit actually secure a loan. For this reason, returns do not converge: the return 
of housing investment, due to credit rationing, is greater than the interest rate of 
housing loans r*. Defining the interest rate rp as the one which would prevail were 
the credit market perfect, the rate of return can be expressed as follows.  
(12)  Return p
t









* r rp λ ≡ ,    1 ≥ λ  
  Note that, as illustrated in figure (7), rp is the market interest rate that 
would prevail if expected return of loans ρ were a monotonic function of r, i.e., if 
both adverse selection and incentive effects would not prevail. In such a case the 
supply credit curve would also be monotonic. If the credit demand is fully satis-







Figure 7: Interest rate in both  
rationed and non rationed credit markets 
 
  From this expression we derive the dynamic equation of  t q  – expression 
(14). It should be noted that the interest rate of housing loans, as formulated in  
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section 3, is a function of the market interest rate, of mortgage foreclosure costs, 
and of the other administrative costs, and is defined by the process in which banks 
maximize the return of their loans. Note that we assume a decreasing relation 
between the degree of institutional development, given by law enforcement and 
property rights, and the mortgage foreclosure costs. In this sense, less institution-










q r R q r q
) (
). ( ). (
* &  
 (15)  t t t k n i k ) ( δ + − = &  
  The accumulation of the housing capital per family is given by expression 
(15). What in essence changes is the investment function of the families. Here it is 
defined with the aggregation of investment performed by three wealth layers of 
society: a, b and c, such that Wc < Wb < Wa. We assume that all layers grow at a 
constant rate n. As already argued in section 3, there is a W0, which is the mini-
mum critical wealth level that a family must have to belong to the rationed-credit 
market, such that Wc < W0 < Wb. The investment of families that belong to the a 
and c layers are self-financed, as described in section 3, and it depends only on the 
real estate market value, because they are supposed to be based on identical and 
homothetic preference structures. Equation (16) expresses this relation, where 
1 − = π t t q  is the excess of real estate market price over unit construction costs, 
and  0 > σ , showing that a greater real estate market value will stimulate invest-
ments.  
(16)   t t
a
t
c i i π σ ≡ ≡ .  
 For  the  b layer of wealth, the investment function is defined by the sum of 
the financed investment, which is determined in the equilibrium of the credit 
market L*, with self-investment performed by those families that seek credit but 
do not receive it. Please note that L* is the financed value of the property, which 
can be expressed by the product of the number of contracts with the price of fi-
nanced real estate. On behalf of simplicity, it is assumed that the self-investment 
share of this layer of wealth is identical to the investment function of the other 
wealth layers. Expression (17) shows this relation.  
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(17)   ) .(
*
t t t
b i π σ + ≡ l  
  Loans per family  ) ( t l  in the rationed-credit market are given by equation 
(18), which establishes the basic relation discussed in the last section among the 
amount of loans, interest rate, mortgage foreclosure costs and loanable funds.  
(18)   ) , (
* *
t t t s r g = l  
  In this equation, a reduction on the prime interest rate has positive impacts 
on the credit supply per family, so that  0 < ′ r g . On the other hand, an expansion 
on loanable funds per family ( t s ) has a positive effect on credit supply, so that, 
0 > ′ s g . Thus, the investment per family is defined by expression (19). Substitut-
ing this last expression in (20) we arrive at the equation of capital accumulation. 
(19)   ) 1 .( ) , (
* − σ + ≡ t t t t q s r g i  
(20)   t t t t t k n q s r g k ). ( ) 1 .( ) , (
* δ + − − σ + = &  
  Equations (14) and (20) form a system of differential equations with saddle 
stability, as showed in the Mathematical Appendix. Based on these equations, in 
the appendix we also derive the curves of stationary dynamics of  t q  and of  t k , as 
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Figure 8: Steady state equilibrium in housing market  
  20 
  Finally, it is worthwhile to point out the effects of institutional changes on 
the equilibrium of the housing market, which compete with changes in wealth 
distribution and monetary policy. These effects can be evaluated by the model’s 
comparative statics, which is calculated from the application of the implicit func-
tion theorem in the system formed by equations (A.1) and (A.12), if all other pa-
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  Propositions 1, 2 and 3 below bring the reaction of changes in the interest 
rate, in the economy’s average wealth, and in the availability of loanable funds in 
the equilibrium of the housing market.  
 
Proposition 1: A rise in prime interest rates depresses the price of real estate, 
but this it can have either positive or negative impacts on the steady-state stock of 
housing capital per family. 
  
  This conclusion emerges directly from the derivates of q* and k* in relation 
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dq r ,  
is negative, since the numerator is negative, unlike the denominator, which is 
positive. But the second derivate could have either positive or negative signal, 
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dk r .  
 
Proposition 2: The expansion of wealth raises market prices of real estate and 
leads to a greater stock of capital.  
 
  This result comes from the derivates of q* and k* in relation to w, due to the 
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Proposition 3: An increase in loanable funds brings a steady-state equilibrium 
with greater level of welfare, in which the housing capital per family is higher, 
and the price of real estate is lower. 
 
  This argument is implied directly by the fact that an expansion on loanable 
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  Therefore, the monetary policy that leads to a low prime interest rate, al-
though leaves real estate investments more attractive, does not necessarily leads 
to an increase in the stock of housing capital, since rationing on real estate credit 
market can inhibit housing investments. In its turn, housing policies that drive 
more funds to credit market, as a consequence of developing an environment 
where property rights are safeguarded, i.e. improving the secondary market for 
mortgage securities, have unambiguous welfare effects, since they leads to low 
real estate property prices and high housing capital per family.  
5.  Concluding remarks  
The model developed in this article, which combines the tradition of dynamic 
models of housing investment with the premises of the New Institutional Econom-
ics and the considerations of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and (1992) on rationing in 
the credit market, allows us to identify the role of institutions on housing devel-
opment. Economies that better ensure property rights, with the effects this has on 
wealth distribution in society, reach higher levels of housing development. This 
degree of property rights is intimately associated to the granting of property titles. 
In societies in which land is not properly held, this attribution is smaller, which in 
turn reduces the demand for credit and the role this market can play in housing 
development. 
  On the other hand, institutions that ensure due fulfillment of contracts, 
such as legislation that allows automatic mortgage foreclosure, or a secondary 
market for mortgages, reduce the transaction costs and consequently the interest 
rate of real estate loans. This has a negative effect on credit rationing, which al- 
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lows banks to finance more families, with the consequent impact on housing de-
velopment. 
  The argument formalized in this paper corroborates the arguments of   
Barzel (1997) and De Soto (2000), among others, on the role of institutions and of 
property rights in economic development. Future research in this field should 
therefore seek to empirically identify if credit is rationed and if property rights 
affect the equilibrium price of housing loans. In this area, it is worthwhile to com-
pare countries with developed credit markets and institutions with others in 
which neither institutions nor the financial market are developed.  
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